Reykjavik, 19 May 2011

Richard Whish, King's College London

Article 102 TFEU: Modern Enforcement and the Commission's Guidance Paper

STRUCTURE OF PRESENTATION

- INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS ABOUT ARTICLE 102
- BRIEF DISCUSSION OF MARKET DEFINITION AND MARKET POWER
- ABUSE
 - WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF ARTICLE 102?
 - THE 'REFORM' OF ARTICLE 102
 - THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S GUIDANCE ON ARTICLE 102 ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES
 - THE MOVE TOWARDS A 'CONSUMER WELFARE' STANDARD
 - THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION, NOT CONSUMERS
- CONCLUSIONS

Richard Whish King's College London

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

- ARTICLE 102 APPLIES TO THE UNILATERAL BEHAVIOUR OF A DOMINANT FIRM
- IT CAN ALSO APPLY TO THE BEHAVIOUR OF COLLECTIVELY DOMINANT FIRMS, THOUGH THIS HAS BEEN RELATIVELY LITTLE EXPLORED – MOST CASES ON COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE OR 'TACIT COLLUSION' HAVE ARISEN UNDER MERGER CONTROL RATHER THAN ARTICLE 102

Richard Whish King's College London

3

Article 102 TFEU: Modern Enforcement and the Commission's Guidance Paper

MARKET DEFINITION AND MARKET POWER

- MARKET DEFINITION IS AN ESSENTIAL STARTING POINT IN ANY ARTICLE 102 CASE: SEE THE COURT OF JUSTICE IN CONTINENTAL CAN V COMMISSION (1973)
- HOWEVER MARKET DEFINITION IS A TOOL: ULTIMATELY THE QUESTION TO BE DETERMINED IS WHETHER A FIRM HAS SIGNIFICANT MARKET POWER ('A DOMINANT POSITION')
- DOMINANCE IS A BINARY CONCEPT EITHER YOU HAVE IT OR YOU DO NOT

Richard Whish King's College London

MARKET DEFINITION AND MARKET POWER

- MARKET SHARE FIGURES CAN BE ASCRIBED TO FIRMS WITHIN THE RELEVANT MARKET: DOMINANCE IS ASSUMED AT A MARKET SHARE OF 50% OR MORE, BUT THIS IS REBUTTABLE
- MARKET SHARES TELL US NOTHING ABOUT POTENTIAL ENTRANTS – NOTE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BARRIERS TO ENTRY
- AND MARKET SHARES TELL US NOTHING ABOUT BUYER POWER

Richard Whish King's College London 5

Article 102 TFEU: Modern Enforcement and the Commission's Guidance Paper

ABUSE

- TEXTBOOKS TEND TO DIVIDE ABUSE INTO 'EXPLOITATIVE' AND 'EXCLUSIONARY' ABUSES
- SOME CASES ARE CONCERNED WITH EXPLOITATION – FOR EXAMPLE CHARGING HIGH PRICES, DISCRIMINATION, INEFFICIENCY. THESE CASES ARE RARE
- AND NOTE THAT SOMETIMES CHARGING HIGH PRICES MAY ACTUALLY BE EXCLUSIONARY WHEN THEY ARE, IN EFFECT, A REFUSAL TO SUPPLY Richard Whish

King's College London

ABUSE

- MOST CASES ARE CONCERNED WITH EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES. EXAMPLES ARE
 - > LONG-TERM EXCLUSIVE AGREEMENTS AND/OR CONDITIONAL REBATES
 - > 'TIE-INS' AND BUNDLING

Richard Whish, King's College London 7

Article 102 TFEU: Modern Enforcement and the Commission's Guidance Paper

ABUSE

- FURTHER EXAMPLES OF ABUSE
 - > PREDATORY PRICING
 - > REFUSALS TO SUPPLY
- NOTE THAT THIS LIST IS NOT EXHAUSTIVE (SEE EG ASTRAZENECA)

Richard Whish, King's College

ABUSE

- BUT WHAT DO WE MEAN BY AN EXCLUSIONARY ABUSE? MORE FUNDAMENTALLY, WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF ARTICLE 102?
 - TO KEEP MARKETS OPEN AND PROTECT ECONOMIC FREEDOM?
 - > TO ACHIEVE FAIRNESS?
 - > TO PREVENT UNDUE DISCRIMINATION?
 - > TO PROTECT THE SINGLE MARKET?
 - > TO PROTECT COMPETITORS?
 - > TO PROTECT THE PROCESS OF COMPETITION?
 - > TO PROTECT CONSUMER WELFARE?

Richard Whish, King's College London 9

Article 102 TFEU: Modern Enforcement and the Commission's Guidance Paper

ABUSE

- A DIFFERENT ISSUE: WHATEVER THE PURPOSE OF ARTICLE 102, IS IT POSSIBLE TO DEVISE ADMINISTRATABLE RULES, CAPABLE OF APPLICATION BY BUSINESSES, ADVISERS, COMPETITION AUTHORITIES AND COURTS?
- AND SHOULD WE BE MORE WORRIED ABOUT FALSE POSITIVES OR FALSE NEGATIVES?

Richard Whish, King's College

ABUSE

- AN ADDED CONCERN: THE US FEDERAL COURTS HAVE 'SHRUNK' THE SCOPE OF SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT OVER MANY YEARS (SEE RECENTLY TRINKO, LINKLINE)
- PRACTICES THAT WOULD BE LEGAL IN THE US CAN BE ILLEGAL IN THE EU (REFUSAL TO SUPPLY, MARGIN SQUEEZE, PREDATORY PRICING)

Richard Whish King's College London 11

Article 102 TFEU: Modern Enforcement and the Commission's Guidance Paper

ABUSE

- THE US IS MORE WORRIED ABOUT FALSE POSITIVES THAN FALSE NEGATIVES
- IS THE EU THE OTHER WAY AROUND?

Richard Whish King's College London

- IN THE 1990s AND 2000s MUCH OF EU COMPETITION LAW WAS REFORMED, AND A 'MORE ECONOMIC APPROACH' WAS TAKEN
 - > VERTICALS REFORM UNDER ARTICLE 101
 - > EUMR REFORM AND GUIDELINES ON HORIZONTAL AND NON-HORIZONTAL MERGERS
 - TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER GUIDELINES, HORIZONTAL COOPERATION AGREEMENTS ETC.

Richard Whish, King's College London

13

Article 102 TFEU: Modern Enforcement and the Commission's Guidance Paper

- ARTICLE 102 CANNOT BE 'REFORMED' IN THE SAME WAY AS OTHER ASPECTS OF COMPETITION LAW, SINCE THERE IS NO DELEGATED LEGISLATION: THE LAW IS WHAT THE EU COURTS SAY IT IS
- THE CASE-LAW ON ARTICLE 102 CONTAINS MANY 'RULES' OF A FORMALISTIC, 'PER SE' NATURE
- ECONOMIC INSIGHTS HAVE SHOWN THAT SOME OF THESE RULES MAY BE PERVERSE

Richard Whish King's College London

- THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION CANNOT 'UNSAY'
 THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EU COURTS BY
 WRITING GUIDELINES THAT ARE INCONSISTENT
 WITH IT
- THE COMMISSION INITIATED A REVIEW OF THE LAW ARTICLE 102 IN 2004
- A WIDE-RANGING DEBATE FOLLOWED

Richard Whish King's College London 15

Article 102 TFEU: Modern Enforcement and the Commission's Guidance Paper

ABUSE

- THIS CULMINATED IN THE COMMISSION'S
 GUIDANCE ON ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES IN
 RELATION TO EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES OF 2009
- NOTE: GUIDANCE NOT GUIDELINES
- THE GUIDANCE DOES NOT ALWAYS FOLLOW THE LAW: WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE A COURT THAT IS HEARING AN ARTICLE 102 CASE?

Richard Whish King's College London

ABUSE

- THE COMMISSION CONSISTENTLY SAYS THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE COMPETITION RULES IS TO PROMOTE CONSUMER WELFARE
- IT SPECIFICALLY SAYS THAT ARTICLE 102 PROTECTS THE PROCESS OF COMPETITION, NOT COMPETITORS
- AND THAT ARTICLE 102 IS PREDOMINANTLY ABOUT PROTECTING 'AS EFFICIENT' COMPETITORS, NOT LESS EFFICIENT Richard Whish COMPETITORS

King's College London

17

Article 102 TFEU: Modern Enforcement and the **Commission's Guidance Paper**

ABUSE

- IN THE CASE OF PRICING ABUSES, THIS INVOLVES **EXAMINING THE PRACTICES OF THE DOMINANT** UNDERTAKING AGAINST AN APPROPRIATE MEASURE OF COST
- SEE PARAGRAPHS 23-27 ON AVERAGE AVOIDABLE COST AND LONG-RUN AVERAGE INCREMENTAL COST

Richard Whish King's College London

CONCLUSIONS

- THE TREND OF COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT IS TOWARDS AN EFFECTS-BASED STANDARD
- UNILATERAL CONDUCT IS TOO COMPLEX TO BE DEALT WITH BY PER SE OR FORMAL RULES
- A FORMALISTIC APPROACH LEADS TO FALSE POSITIVES

Richard Whish King's College London 19

Article 102 TFEU: Modern Enforcement and the Commission's Guidance Paper

CONCLUSIONS

- THE GUIDANCE DOES NOT STATE THE LAW; BUT IT CAN HELP TO SHAPE THE LAW
- LET'S REVIEW THE POSITION IN 2021!

Richard Whish King's College London